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Blown Whistle Falls on Deaf Ears: The
Eighth Circuit Interprets MAP-21’s
Whistleblower Provision
Barcomb v. Gen. Motors, LLC., 978 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2020).
Sarah (Walters) Porter*

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, whistleblowers have been praised as heroes by
onlookers and in the media for bravely unveiling wrongdoing by their
employers, but whistleblowers have not always enjoyed this white-hat
status.1 These private employees expose themselves to serious risks of
backlash and retaliation from their employers, historically without any
guaranteed protection from Congress or their respective state legislatures.2
Decades-old social norms and corporate culture prioritized loyalty from
employees. They allowed employers to fire employees who spoke out
against the company and even blackball them from their respective
industries.3 With blind loyalty or termination being the only options for
employees witnessing wrongdoing within their company, silence was the
norm.4 Over the last few decades, Congress has increasingly recognized
the public importance of protecting these whistleblowers and has enacted
*

B.S., B.A., Columbia College, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021; Associate
Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022. I am grateful to Professor Gely
for his insight and guidance during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri
Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1
David Kwok, The Public Wrong of Whistleblower Retaliation, 69 HASTINGS
L.J. 1225, 1227 (2018).
2
Id.
3
Joel D. Hesch, Whistleblower Rights and Protections: Critiquing Federal
Whistleblower Laws and Recommending Filling in Missing Pieces to Form A
Beautiful Patchwork Quilt, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 51 (2011).
4
Id.
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more than two dozen statutes mandating protection from retaliation in a
wide variety of industries, with more than half the states following suit.5
In Barcomb v. General Motors, Richard Barcomb, a mechanic at a
General Motors, LLC (“GM”) manufacturing plant, sued GM in federal
court, alleging he was terminated for complaining about reports by his
coworkers in the Final Process Repair Department, falsely claiming to
have repaired defects in the steering plugs and other safety-related aspects
of vehicles.6 Barcomb alleged his firing violated the whistleblower
provision of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act
(“MAP-21”).7 In addressing this issue as one of first impression, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of GM, finding that “MAP-21’s text protects employees who report
‘information relating to any motor vehicle defect’ – not those who report
problems with a process for ensuring quality control along the assembly
line.”8
This Note begins with an explanation of the facts and holding of the
Barcomb decision. Part III reviews the history of federal whistleblower
statutes, outlines the text of the whistleblower provision of MAP-21, and
concludes with a discussion of the intended interpretation of federal
whistleblower statutes based on established precedent. Part IV outlines the
majority opinion of the Eighth Circuit as well as the dissenting opinion by
Judge Melloy. Part V describes an alternative claim available for
whistleblowers and discusses why it is often an inadequate remedy.
Ultimately, this Note argues that MAP-21’s whistleblower provision
should be broadly construed in favor of protecting whistleblowers to
follow precedent set by federal courts interpreting similar whistleblower
statutes.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Richard Barcomb, a long-time GM employee, began working in
GM’s Final Process Repair Department in a Wentzville, Missouri
manufacturing plant in 2014.9 His duties included repairing any defects
found in the vehicles coming off the manufacturing line that had occurred

5

Kwok, supra note 1, at 1227.
Barcomb v. Gen. Motors LLC, 978 F.3d 545, 547–48 (8th Cir. 2020).
7
Barcomb v. Gen. Motors LLC, 4:16-CV-01884-SNLJ, 2019 WL 296479, at 1
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2019), aff'd sub nom. Barcomb, 978 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2020).
8
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 550.
9
Barcomb, 2019 WL 296479, at 1. Barcomb worked for GM for 17 years in a
variety of different roles throughout the nation. Id.
6
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in an earlier stage of production.10 As vehicles proceeded through the
assembly line and errors occurred, employees were required to report and
keep a log of damaged vehicles in the Global Standard Inspection Process
(“GSIP”), an electronic repair-tracking system, as well as on paper
tickets.11 The vehicles then went through the Final Repair stage.12 In this
stage, mechanics like Barcomb would repair the errors marked in the GSIP
and on the tickets.13 Upon completion, the employee would mark the
repair as complete in GSIP and on the paper ticket.14 The vehicle was then
tested once more and sent through a final inspection process.15
In January 2015, Barcomb began suspecting that his co-workers were
falsely documenting repairs as complete in the GSIP system without
completing them.16 The unresolved errors ranged from simple cosmetic
issues to more serious, safety-related concerns, both of which could have
passed through the Final Process Repair Department undetected.17
Concerned with the safety of the vehicles, Barcomb began making the
necessary repairs himself based on the paper tickets found on each
windshield.18 On one occasion, Barcomb found that both the paper ticket
and the GSIP indicated that a broken steering plug had been repaired, but
a note on the vehicle's windshield indicated otherwise.19 Barcomb made
the necessary repair and reported the incident to GM’s safety hotline.20 He
also made reports to his supervisor, shift leaders, and the General
Assembly Area Manager regarding several specific incomplete repairs and
the false reporting done by his co-workers.21 Eventually, GM conducted
a high-level internal investigation, which resulted in corrective action.22
However, Barcomb’s repeated reports, including ones made in March and
April of 2016, began to annoy his superiors and co-workers, causing

10

Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 547.
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 551 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22
Id.; Opening Brief of Appellant at 30–31, Barcomb, 978 F.3d 545.
11
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significant workplace stress for Barcomb.23 On March 4, 2016, after one
such report, Barcomb found a rubber rat in a noose at his workstation.24
On March 31, 2016, Barcomb was reprimanded for not being at his
workstation, resulting in a disciplinary meeting between him and his
superiors.25 When leaving the meeting, his superiors reported Barcomb
said something like, “I’ll see you guys at your funeral.”26 Barcomb denied
this and claimed he said something like, “this is a mistake.”27 Barcomb
was placed on a three-day suspension, during which he saw a doctor for
anxiety.28 He then went on sick leave for four weeks.29 Upon his return
to work on May 2, 2016, his superiors presented him with two disciplinary
options, both of which he declined.30 Barcomb was fired because his
alleged threat created what his superiors deemed a hostile work
environment.31
On April 15, 2016, Barcomb filed a complaint with the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) against GM for retaliation
and notified GM of the complaint that same day.32 On December 1, 2016,
Barcomb filed suit in federal district court against GM, asserting two
claims.33 The first was a retaliatory discharge claim under Section 31307
of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, and the second
alleged wrongful termination in violation of Missouri’s public policy
exception to at-will employment, which protects employees who are

23

Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 551 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Appellee’s Brief at 4, Barcomb, 978 F.3d 545.
29
Id. at 5.
30
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 552 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Barcomb was offered a 30-day suspension if he agreed not to file a grievance
challenging the discipline, which he declined. Appellee’s Brief at 5, Barcomb, 978
F.3d 545. He was then offered a 14-day suspension with an 18-month probationary
period if he agreed not to file a grievance challenging the discipline, which he also
declined. Id.
31
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 552 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
32
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5, Barcomb, 978 F.3d 545.
33
Barcomb v. Gen. Motors LLC., 4:16-CV-01884-SNLJ, 2019 WL 296479, at
2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2019).
25
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terminated for reporting violations of the law.34 GM moved for summary
judgment, asserting that Barcomb did not engage in protected activity
under MAP-21 because that statute only pertains to information related to
defects in vehicles that have fully completed the manufacturing process,
not those relating to errors found during the manufacturing process.35 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted
GM’s motion for summary judgment, finding that retaliation for
“‘complaints on the misuse of the GSIP system as a whole and the false
reporting by one co-worker in particular’ was not actionable under MAP21.”36 Because the MAP-21 claim failed, the second claim of wrongful
termination failed as well.37 Barcomb appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.38
The central question on appeal involved interpreting Section 30171
of MAP-21 to determine whether the statute requires that a complaint
relate to post-manufacturing defects to constitute protected activity or
whether the statute protects reports of defects during the manufacturing
process.39 Barcomb argued three points on appeal.40 First, that the
definitional section of the Motor Vehicle Act did not limit protected
activities under Section 30171 to post-manufacturing whistleblowing. 41
Second, he claimed the district court’s holding conflicted with the letter
and spirit of whistleblower protections under Section 30171.42 Without
protecting reports related to defects in the manufacturing process, almost
no employees in the department would be protected.43 Finally, Barcomb
asserted that he did, in fact, report information relating to defects on fully
manufactured vehicles, which the text of the statute explicitly covered.44
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment based upon a narrow

34
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5, Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 547. MAP-21 “prohibits
motor vehicle defect, noncompliance, or any violation or alleged violation of any
notification or reporting requirement . . . .” 49 U.S.C. § 30171(a)(1).
35
Barcomb, 2019 WL 296479 at 3.
36
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 547.
37
Barcomb, 2019 WL 296479 at 4. Missouri case law requires that a wrongful
termination claim be “based on a constitutional provision, a statute, a regulation based
on a statute, or a rule promulgated by a government body.” Id.
38
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 547.
39
Id. at 548.
40
Id. at 548–50.
41
Id. at 548.
42
Id. at 549.
43
Id.
44
See id. at 549–50.
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interpretation of Section 30171 and MAP-21’s corresponding
definitions.45 The court found that because Barcomb’s reports simply
identified a potential risk of defect caused by errors in the reporting
system, rather than “information about processes that created defects in
motor vehicles,” they did not qualify as protected activity under MAP21.46

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part first discusses the history of federal whistleblower statutes
and describes the policy rationales behind protecting whistleblowers.
Next, it outlines the text and key definitions of the whistleblower provision
of MAP-21 and the statute’s legislative history and purpose. This Part
concludes with a discussion of a few precedential cases in which courts
have interpreted similar whistleblower statutes.

A. History and Purpose of Federal Whistleblower Protection Statutes
The first protections for whistleblowers in the United States were
established in 1777 when ten revolutionary sailors and marines reported
misconduct by the Commander of the Continental Navy.47 In response,
the commander filed a criminal libel suit against the whistleblowers, and
two of them were arrested.48 Within the month, Congress enacted the
nation’s first mandatory whistleblower law.49 It stated, “it is the duty of all
persons in the service of the United States… to give the earliest
information to Congress or any other proper authority of any misconduct,
frauds or misdemeanors committed by any officers or persons in the
service of these states, which may come to their knowledge.”50 Congress
also voted to cover the legal costs of the whistleblowers’ defense.51 The
whistleblowers won, and Congress paid out $1,418 in legal expenses,
which amounts to $36,959 today.52 While that particular case resulted in
a favorable outcome for the whistleblowers, historically, employees who
have reported wrongdoing by their employers have been labeled as
45

Id. at 550.
Id. at 549–50.
47
Elizabeth A. Williams, Blowing the Whistle While Gasping for Air, 18 LOY.
MAR. L.J. 219, 222–23 (2019).
48
Id. at 222.
49
Id. at 222–23.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 223.
52
Id.
46
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snitches and instantly fired for speaking out against their company, no
questions asked.53 The threat of such significant consequences has caused
whistleblowers to stay silent rather than act on the unlawful activities they
witness.54
Unfortunately, this silence has had significant consequences, ranging
from serious safety violations in the automobile industry to government
intelligence failures leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11th.55
Over the past few decades, following the enactment of almost two dozen
federal laws prohibiting retaliation, the United States has seen a significant
increase in the number of employees raising concerns about perceived
unlawful activities on the part of their employers.56 The tide began to turn,
and these individuals started receiving recognition and praise for coming
forward.57 In 2002, Time Magazine even put three whistleblowers on its
cover, labeling that year “The Year of the Whistleblower.” 58
Today, there are more than two dozen federal whistleblower statutes;
some strictly protect government employees, while others protect private
employees in specific industries.59 States are now following suit, with
more than half enacting general whistleblower protections for public
employees – though only eight states have enacted protections for private
employees.60
The essential role of whistleblowing has become
increasingly apparent. Over time, governmental protection has expanded
to enable these employees to help the government unveil unlawful and
potentially harmful activities without fear of retaliation.61 This has led to
more than 3,000 whistleblowing cases reported in 2018 and 2019

53

Hesch, supra note 3, at 53.
Id.
55
Id. at 51–53.
56
See Debra S. Katz, Emerging Issues in Whistleblower Law and Retaliation,
PRAC. L., Dec. 2017, at 37.
57
Brandon Gaille, 23 Important Whistleblower Statistics, BRANDON GAILLE
SMALL BUS. & MKTG. ADVICE (May 23, 2017), https://brandongaille.com/22important-whistleblowing-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/B3BG-6VTH].
58
Id.
59
See STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 165–67 (Carolina
Academic Press 2017); see also OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION DIRECTORATE OF
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS (DWPP) WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES
SUMMARY CHART 1–11 (2021), https://www.whistleblowers.gov/sites/wb/files/202106/Whistleblower_Statutes_Summary_Chart_FINAL_6-7-21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NMM7-UY67].
60
WILLBORN, supra note 59, at 167.
61
Williams, supra note 47, at 225.
54
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respectively and more than 3400 cases in 2020.62 This increase, however,
does not mean that the whistleblowers are successful on their claims. A
court’s interpretation of the applicable whistleblower provision is often the
deciding factor in whether that individual will receive protection. 63 This
includes recent whistleblower statutes such as MAP-21.

B. The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act
As defined in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966, a “defect” includes “any defect in performance, construction, a
component, or material of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.”64
“Motor vehicle equipment” means “any system, part, or component of a
motor vehicle as originally manufactured.”65 According to internal
OSHA documents describing its view of the scope and coverage protected
activity for MAP-21’s whistleblower provision, Section 30171 does not
require that the employee report an actual violation of a motor vehicle
safety law.66 Rather, an employee is protected for providing information
relating to any activity that he or she reasonably believes to be a defect,
noncompliance, or violation.67 A report based on a belief that a violation
or defect exists that is mistaken but objectively reasonable under the
circumstances is considered protected activity.68
Chapter 301 of Title 49 of the United States Code gives the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) the authority to

62
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., WHISTLEBLOWER DOCKETED
CASES
RECEIVED:
FY2015
–
FY2020
1
(2020),
https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/3D_Charts-Received_Closed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BXE-MAYT]. In 2020, reports were most commonly filed under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act,
the Federal Railroad Safety Act, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Id.
63
See, e.g., Haley v. Retsinas, 138 F.3d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998); Neal v.
Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 270 (N.D. Ill. 1993); N.L.R.B. v. Scrivener, 405
U.S. 117, 122 (1972).
64
49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(3) (2016).
65
49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8)(A).
66
OSHA WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM, INVESTIGATOR’S DESK AID
TO THE MOVING AHEAD FOR PROGRESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY ACT (MAP-21)
EMPLOYEE PROTECTION PROVISION 49 U.S.C. § 30171 4–5 (last visited Jan. 4, 2022),
https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/MAP-21-Desk-Aid-FINAL-1-13-2020002.pdf [https://perma.cc/39Y9-WB5C].
67
Id. at 4.
68
Id. at 5. Although this is the viewpoint expressed in the summary sheet
released by OSHA, this does not align with the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the
statute, discussed infra Part IV.
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promulgate motor vehicle safety standards. It also details other reporting
and notification requirements for auto manufacturers and parts suppliers.69
Chapter 301 of the United States Code, where MAP-21 is found, is titled
“Motor Vehicle Safety.”70 At the beginning of this chapter, Congress laid
out a broad statement of the purpose and policy behind the provisions
found within: to “reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting
from traffic accidents… by prescrib[ing] motor vehicle safety
standards…and carry[ing] out needed safety research and development.”71
Former President Barack Obama signed MAP-21 into law on July 6,
2012.72
The law authorized funding for multiple highway and
transportation programs and included the whistleblower provision at issue
in Barcomb – Section 30171.73 This provision protects employees of
automobile manufacturers, parts suppliers, and dealerships from
retaliation or discrimination for providing information to their employers
or the United States Department of Transportation “about motor vehicle
defects, noncompliance, or violations of the notification or reporting
requirements enforced by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) or for engaging in related protected activities set
forth in the provision.”74 The agency responsible for enforcing this
provision is the Secretary of Labor, which in turn delegates the
responsibility to the OSHA.75
The whistleblower provision of MAP-21, Section 30171, specifically
provides that:
No motor vehicle manufacturer, part supplier, or dealership may
discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate against an employee
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a
request of the employee)… provided, caused to be provided, or is
about to provide (with any knowledge of the employer) or cause to be
provided to the employer or the Secretary of Transportation
information relating to any motor vehicle defect, noncompliance, or
69

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., FILING WHISTLEBLOWER
COMPLAINTS UNDER THE MOVING AHEAD FOR PROGRESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY ACT
(2016),
https://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MAP-21Whistleblower-OSHA-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/382Q-2GKZ].
70
49 U.S.C. § 30101 (1994).
71
Id.
72
Judith E. Kramer, OSHA Adds Another Whistleblower Provision to its
Arsenal, 9 NO. 12 FED. EMP. L. INSIDER 7 (Aug. 2012).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
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any violation or alleged violation of any notification or reporting
requirement of this chapter.76

Federal courts’ interpretation of several other whistleblower
provisions helped to inform the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of section
30171.

C. Interpretation of Similar Federal Whistleblower Protection
Statutes
In general, whistleblower statutes are to be broadly construed in order
to further the statutes’ remedial purpose.77 Courts will first look to the
“text of the statute itself, and if the plain meaning of the language clearly
expresses the meaning Congress intended, the judicial inquiry ends
there.”78 However, if the language is ambiguous, courts must consider the
“purpose, the subject matter and the condition of affairs which led to its
enactment.”79 In Haley v. Retsinas, a former employee brought an action
under the whistleblower provision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,
alleging he was wrongfully terminated from his position as a bank
examiner for the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) because of the
information he provided about potential unlawful activity on the part of
his employer.80 The section at issue provided that:
No Federal banking agency ... may discharge ... any employee ...
because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to the request
of the employee) provided information to any such agency ... regarding
any possible violation of any law or regulation, gross mismanagement,
a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety.81

76

49 U.S.C. § 30171 (2012).
Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 270 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Many courts
have addressed issues similar to the one before us today under different federal
whistleblower protection statutes. Almost without exception, they have held that the
coverage of the statute at issue should be broadly construed so as to include internal,
or ‘intracorporate’ whistleblowing, even where the conduct involved did not come
under the literal terms of the statute.”).
78
Haley v. Retsinas, 138 F.3d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998).
79
Id. (quoting United States v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 1997)).
80
Id. at 1246–48.
81
Id. at 1249 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1831j(a)(2)). “Federal banking agency”
includes the FDIC and the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision. 12 U.S.C. §
1831j(e); Haley, 138 F.3d at 1249.
77
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Haley had uncovered potential violations of federal banking laws and
regulations by his employer while inspecting an OTS-regulated firm. He
raised these concerns with Bayard Plowman, the managing officer of the
firm that would be harmed by his employer’s actions.82 When Plowman
told Haley that he intended to bring this situation to the attention of
Congress or the FDIC, Haley drafted a memorandum outlining his
understanding of OTS’s allegedly unlawful activity. Haley sent the
memorandum to his superiors, a state regulator in the county, and
Plowman – instructing Plowman to use the memorandum in any way
necessary, although not specifically requesting that it be handed over to
the FDIC.83 Haley was subsequently terminated for providing confidential
information to an outside third party.84
The first issue in the case was whether Haley’s conduct constituted a
“request” sufficient to trigger the protections afforded by the statute.85 In
construing the language of the statute, particularly the meaning of the word
“request,” the Eighth Circuit noted that if the meaning of the statute is
unclear from the text, “courts tend to construe it broadly, in favor of
protecting the whistleblower,” as this was the best way to “avoid a
nonsensical result and to effectuate the underlying purposes of the law.”86
The court also used this broad interpretive approach when resolving the
second issue in the case – whether Haley’s memo, which merely included
his own personal disagreement with his employer’s policy and no specific
illegal activity, constituted “information regarding possible violations of
any law.”87 The court again adopted a broad approach and determined
Haley’s personal criticisms of his employer’s activities sufficient to
qualify as protected activity under the statute.88
In N.L.R.B. v. Scrivener, the Supreme Court of the United States
unanimously held that language found in the National Labor Relations Act
covered a whistleblower who did not meet the literal requirements of the
statute.89 The section at issue in the case provided that, “It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer… to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given
testimony under this Act.”90 The issue was whether an employee who
82

Haley, 138 F.3d at 1247.
Id. at 1247–48.
84
Id. at 1248.
85
Id. at 1249.
86
Id. at 1250 (quoting United States v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 1997)).
87
Id. at 1251 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1831j(a)(2)).
88
Id.
89
N.L.R.B. v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972).
90
Id. at 117–18 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158) (emphasis added).
83
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provided a sworn statement to the National Labor Relations Board field
examiner that was investigating unfair labor practices by that employer,
but who did not file a charge or testify at a formal hearing, was protected
from retaliation under the statute.91 The Court broadly construed the
protections of the Act for several reasons, including that its textual analysis
revealed that the words “or otherwise discriminate” were intended by
Congress to “afford broad rather than narrow protection to the employee.”
And because a broad construction comported with the congressional
purpose of the Act 92 An alternative interpretation would have provided
“unequal and inconsistent protection.”93
In Bechtel Constr. Co v. Secretary of Labor, the statute at issue
provided protection for any employee who “commenced, caused to be
commenced…testif[ied] in…or assisted or participated in any manner
in…a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement
imposed under…the Atomic Energy Act.”94 In that case, the employee
had repeatedly raised concerns about safety procedures for handling
contaminated tools to his supervisors.95 The Eleventh Circuit determined
that although the Act did not define the term “proceeding,” under a broad
construction of the statute, the employee’s informal complaints were
indeed protected.96 The court found it was appropriate to give a broad
construction to remedial statutes such as nondiscrimination provisions in
federal labor laws to “encourage safety concerns to be raised and resolved
promptly and at the lowest possible level of bureaucracy.”97

IV. INSTANT DECISION
This Part outlines the majority opinion of the Eighth Circuit,
beginning with its interpretation of the whistleblower provision of MAP21. It describes the arguments raised by Barbomb, as well as the court’s
response to each. This Part concludes with an explanation of the dissenting
opinion by Judge Melloy, which emphasizes the application of the plain
language of the statute and congressional intent for interpreting the
whistleblower protections of MAP-21.

91

Id. at 118.
Id. at 121–25.
93
Id. at 124.
94
Bechtel Const. Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 50 F.3d 926, 931 (11th Cir. 1995)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)–(3)).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 931–32.
97
Id. at 933.
92
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A. Majority Opinion
In Barcomb, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s ruling de
novo. It affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of GM because
it found Barcomb’s complaints were not protected activity under MAP21.98 The court began its analysis with the statutory text.99 Specifically,
MAP-21 protects employees that provide “information relating to any
motor vehicle defect.”100 The court recited the statutory definition of a
defect, which “includes any defect in performance, construction, a
component, or material of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment”
and noted that the “definition [wa]s, unfortunately, circular.”101 To clarify,
the Eighth Circuit resorted to a dictionary definition published near in time
to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, stating that
a defect is the “want or absence of something necessary for completeness,
perfection, or adequacy in form or function.”102 The court defined a motor
vehicle and motor vehicle equipment, emphasizing that each one of these
definitions focuses on the resulting product rather than the internal
manufacturing process or quality assurance systems used by

98
Barcomb v. Gen. Motors, LLC., 978 F.3d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 2020). Barcomb
also appealed the district court’s grant of $7,094 in costs to GM. Id. at 550. Barcomb
argued that GM’s counsel did not submit a verified bill of costs within the twenty-one
day requirement and therefore, the grant of costs was an abuse of discretion by the
district court. Id. On this issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed as to the postage and shipping costs of $76.50. Id. Because this issue
does not relate to application of the statute at hand, it will not be discussed further in
this note. See id.
99
Id. at 548.
100
Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 30171(a)(1) (2018)). In full, MAP-21 states: “No
motor vehicle manufacturer, part supplier, or dealership may discharge an employee
or otherwise discriminate against an employee with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting
pursuant to a request of the employee)--(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about
to provide (with any knowledge of the employer) or cause to be provided to the
employer or the Secretary of Transportation information relating to any motor vehicle
defect, noncompliance, or any violation or alleged violation of any notification or
reporting requirement of this chapter.”49 U.S.C. § 30171(a)(1). Because Barcomb’s
arguments rely solely on the phrase “information relating to any motor vehicle defect,”
that is the portion the court, and this Note, highlights. Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 548
(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 30171(a)(1)).
101
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 548.
102
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 548 (quoting Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (1976)); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 Pub. L.
89–563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966).
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automakers.103 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit interpreted MAP-21 as
protecting employees who provide information about an issue with the
“completeness, perfection, or adequacy of the performance, construction,
a component, or the material of a motor vehicle or its components.”104 The
court continued to rely on this “finished-product focused” characterization
of the statute’s protections throughout the opinion, as opposed to also
including process defects.105
The Eighth Circuit addressed each of Barcomb’s arguments in
turn.106 First, Barcomb argued that he “provided substantial information
regarding a pattern or practice of false repairs of specific motor vehicle
defects,” which the language of the statute explicitly covered.107 The court
framed his argument as being about “the misuse of the GSIP system as a
whole and the false reporting by one co-worker in particular.”108 The court
stated the subject of that complaint did not fall under “information related
to a motor vehicle defect” because the GSIP system was just one of two
systems used to track needed repairs.109 If both systems failed, there was
still a note attached to the vehicle instructing employees what to fix.
Therefore, the court said this was not “information related to a motor
vehicle defect.”110
Barcomb next argued that the district court improperly restricted
MAP-21’s protection to post-manufacture or completed vehicle defects.111
He argued that “a violation of law need not ‘be completed’ or be
specifically cited for reporting to constitute protected activity.” 112 The
court squarely rejected this argument because it said Barcomb never
reported an alleged violation of law or an alleged violation of a Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard.113 Rather, he only claimed that he was
retaliated against for “reporting information related to motor vehicle
defects.”114 Under the court’s view, the false reporting of repairs for motor

103

Id.
Id.
105
Id. at 550.
106
Id. at 548–51.
107
Id. at 548 (quoting Opening Brief of Appellant at 30, Barcomb, 978 F.3d
545); 49 U.S.C. § 30171(a)(1).
108
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 547–48.
109
Id. at 549.
110
Id. at 550.
111
Id. at 549.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
104
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vehicle defects is not a violation of the law.115 Curiously, the court
provided no further explanation for this holding, and its apparent departure
from the text of section 30171.
Barcomb also argued that MAP-21 protects the expression of
“reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs about legal violations.”116 Thus, even if
he was incorrect that the false reporting constituted a violation of the law
or of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, his belief was reasonable
and thus should be protected.117 In response, the court emphasized that the
other whistleblower statutes cited by Barcomb in support of this argument
are not drafted identically.118 For example, 49 U.S.C. § 20109, which
protects railroad employees, protects those who provide information
relating to “conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a
violation of any Federal law, rule, or regulation.”119 MAP-21, on the other
hand, protects those who provide information relating to “any violation or
alleged violation of any notification or reporting requirement of this
chapter,” and those who object or refuse to participate in “any activity that
the employee reasonably believe[s] to be in violation” of this chapter.120
The Eighth Circuit narrowed in on the fact that these provisions made no
specific mention of a reasonable belief pertaining to “an alleged motor
vehicle defect.”121 The court distinguished reports of technical violations
of the law from reports of motor vehicle defects and decided MAP-21
covered only the former.122
Finally, Barcomb warned that refusing to protect information related
to the manufacturing process would exempt almost all automotive
manufacturing employees from MAP-21’s anti-retaliation protections
because they only work on unfinished vehicles.123 The Eighth Circuit
again relied on its “finished-product” characterization of MAP-21’s
protections.124 Although MAP-21’s plain language protects reports of
“information relating to motor vehicle defects,” the court’s interpretation
of MAP-21’s statutory definitions found they all related to finished
products rather than the processes that lead to the finished product.125 The
115

Id.
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 550.
116
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Eighth Circuit conceded that there was indeed a “fine distinction between
a report about a process and a report about the process’s result.”126
However, the court emphasized that Barcomb’s reports showed only that
if a defect was identified on the assembly line, then one of two quality
assurance systems may not reflect it.127 Therefore, the court concluded,
Barcomb simply identified a potential risk caused by errors in the reporting
system; it was not a report of information about processes that “created
defects in motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment.”128

B. Dissenting Opinion (Melloy, J.)
Judge Melloy authored a dissent in which he emphasized the plain
language of the statute and Congress’s intent to broadly protect
whistleblowers as support for a broader interpretation of MAP-21’s
protections.129 Judge Melloy noted that while Congress originally enacted
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to improve traffic
safety and reduce traffic accidents, in 2012, MAP-21 amended it to add
whistleblower protections in the automobile industry.130 Judge Melloy
critiqued the majority for reading the whistleblower protections in two
separate parts.131 The majority held that whistleblowers who provide
information related to any violation or alleged violation of any reporting
requirement of the chapter might rely on their own reasonable belief that
such a violation has occurred, purely because the word “alleged” is
included in that portion. 132 However, a whistleblower who simply
provides information related to any motor vehicle defect cannot report
mere allegations of a defect because the provision does not say “alleged
motor vehicle defect.”133
Judge Melloy began his own analysis by restating the plain language
of the statute: that a whistleblower must simply provide “information
relating to any motor vehicle defect” in order to gain protection.134
Although the statute does not define “relating to,” Judge Melloy noted that
the phrase has not previously been interpreted as a strict or limiting term

126

Id. at 549.
Id.
128
Id. at 549–50.
129
Id. at 553 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130
Id. at 551.
131
Id. at 552.
132
Id. at 551.
133
Id.
134
Id.
127
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and cited multiple examples of such interpretation.135 Therefore, in giving
full effect to the phrase “relating to,” Judge Melloy concluded Barcomb’s
reports of incomplete repairs and false reporting of repairs fell plainly
within the protections of MAP-21.136

V. COMMENT
Although whistleblowers have historically been frowned upon for
being “disloyal” to employers, their bravery plays a crucial role in society
– one that enhances public health and safety and forces employers,
including government officials and agencies, to be held accountable for
their unlawful activity. There is an alternative remedy to statutory claims
for whistleblowers – the common law tort of wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, which Barcomb attempted to bring here.
Although that claim is beneficial to whistleblowers in some circumstances,
it often does not provide an adequate remedy when the individual’s
statutory whistleblower claim fails. Many policy reasons cut in favor of
continued protection of whistleblowers, such as promoting legal
compliance by employers and avoiding the governmental expense of
watchdog and investigative resources. To that end, when language within
a whistleblower provision is ambiguous, such as the language at issue in
Barcomb, the statute should be broadly construed in favor of the
whistleblower in order to align with precedent established by
interpretations of similar federal whistleblower statutes.

A. A Potential Alternative for Whistleblowers – Wrongful Discharge
in Violation of Public Policy
The vast majority of states recognize that an employer’s right to
terminate at-will employees should be limited in cases where such
termination is deemed contrary to public policy.137 Therefore, most states
recognize the common law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy as an exception to at-will employment.138 The most
compelling justification for this doctrine, which regulates contractual
relationships between employers and employees, is to protect third
parties.139 This claim is typically brought in only a handful of contexts,
135

Id.
Id. at 553.
137
STEPHEN P. PEPE & SCOTT H. DUNHAM, AVOIDING
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 1:5 (2022), Westlaw ADWDC.
138
Id.
139
WILLBORN, supra note 59, at 135.
136
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including when an employee refuses to commit an unlawful act and is
therefore terminated or when an employee is terminated for seeking to
exercise a statutory right, such as filing a claim for benefits under a
workers’ compensation statute.140 However, the rationale of protecting
third parties fits most squarely with a whistleblower claim – one brought
by an employee who experiences retaliation as a result of his or her reports
of a company’s wrongful or unlawful conduct.141 Because the employer’s
wrongful or unlawful conduct could have widespread ramifications for the
general public, such as in the auto industry, protection of third parties as a
justification for the violation of public policy claim is readily apparent.142
While most jurisdictions recognize this cause of action, courts
continue to struggle to define its parameters and have taken vastly different
approaches in defining “public policy.”143 For example, in Polmateer v.
International Harvester Co.¸ the Illinois Supreme Court explained that
while “there is no precise definition of the term,” it generally concerns
“what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State
collectively.”144 Other courts, however, require the public policy
exception be “carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated
in constitutional or statutory provisions” so that employers are aware of
the “fundamental public policies of the state and nation as expressed in
their constitutions and statutes.”145 Thus, these courts will only apply the
doctrine where a constitutional provision or statute directly defines a
public policy.
In situations where a specific statute addresses the alleged wrongful
conduct, courts have split over whether the statutory remedy should
preempt the common law claim of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy.146 Some state legislatures have acted to explicitly allow
claimants to pursue both, such as in Arizona, while others leave it up to
the courts to decide.147 However, recent trends indicate that courts often

140

Id. at 138.
Id.
142
Id. at 135.
143
Pepe, supra note 137.
144
Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981).
145
Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687–88 (Cal. 1992).
146
See, e.g., WILLBORN, supra note 59, at 142–43.
147
Id. The Arizona legislature allows both but limits the remedy to that
prescribed in the statute, if one exists. Id. The Arizona Employment Protection Act of
1996 states: “If the statute provides a remedy to an employee for a violation of the
statute, the remedies provided to an employee for violation of the statute are the
exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute or the public policy set forth in or
arising out of the statute….If the statute does not provide a remedy to an employee for
141
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reject wrongful discharge claims if an adequate alternative remedy already
exists.148 For example, courts will not allow an employee discharged
based on race to pursue a common-law wrongful discharge claim; instead,
the employee must pursue a race discrimination claim under Title VII or
various state statutes.149
Similarly, when a specific whistleblower statute provides a remedy,
states vary on whether the statute provides the exclusive remedy or
whether individuals may also elect to pursue the common-law wrongful
discharge claim.150 Courts holding that statutory remedies preempt
common law rights of action create a problem for whistleblowers such as
Barcomb. These whistleblowers are not afforded protection under a
whistleblower statute based on minute definitional discrepancies and a
narrow interpretation that does not cover the individual’s conduct, even
though the individual risked his or her job and reputation to report
wrongdoing within the company.151 Because whistleblowers cannot also
bring a common law wrongful discharge claim, they are left with no
the violation of the statute, the employee shall have the right to bring a tort claim for
wrongful termination in violation of the public policy set forth in the statute. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501(3)(b) (2021).
148
WILLBORN, supra note 59, at 142; see, e.g., Lawson v. Gault, 2013 WL
2010224, at *1 (D.S.C. 2013) (plaintiff cannot bring common law public policy
discharge claim alleging termination for exercising First Amendment right to run for
elective office against her boss since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides adequate
remedy); Hein v. AT&T Operations, Inc., 2010 WL 5313526, at *5 (D. Colo. 2010)
(plaintiff states no common law public policy discharge claim based on employer's
alleged violation of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act where that federal statute provides
adequate remedy); Robinette v. WESTconsin Credit Union, 686 F. Supp. 2d 1206,
1208 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (federal bankruptcy statute provides adequate remedy for
plaintiff allegedly discharged for filing bankruptcy; common law public policy claim
dismissed).
149
WILLBORN, supra note 59, at 142; see, e.g., Clinton v. State ex rel. Locan Cty.
Election Bd., 29 P.3d 543, 546 (Okla. 2001) (holding that an employee who is
terminated due to pregnancy must pursue the adequate federal stator remedy, rather
than a wrongful-discharge claim, even though her discharge violated the state’s clear
and compelling public policy against pregnancy discrimination).
150
WILLBORN, supra note 59, at 166–67. For example, in Michigan, the
Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act provides the exclusive remedy for employees
that are fired for reporting their employer’s unlawful activities. See Shuttleworth v.
Riverside Osteopathic Hosp., 477 N.W.2d 453, 455 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
151
WILLBORN, supra note 59, at 166; see, e.g., Allen v. Charter County of
Wayne, 192 Fed. Appx. 347, 353 (6th Cir. 2006) (because state whistleblower statute
protects employees allegedly terminated for reporting illegal practices, plaintiff could
not bring common law public policy discharge claim based on such circumstances,
even though court also found that plaintiff could not make out statutory whistleblower
claim).
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remedy whatsoever.152 Similarly, if the individual is in a jurisdiction that
does allow pursuit of both but requires the wrongful termination claim to
be “tethered” to policies explicitly found in the state constitution or
statutes, this essentially causes one claim to depend upon the success of
the other.153 Therefore, when whistleblower statutes are not construed
broadly to favor the whistleblower to effectuate the purpose of the
protection, whistleblowers may be left with no common law remedy
either.

B. Policy Rationales and Interpretation of Other Federal
Whistleblower Statutes
The various federal whistleblower statutes with differing statutory
language cannot all be uniformly interpreted to favor the whistleblower
regardless of context. However, when interpreting the ambiguous
language found in these statutes, courts should generally adopt an
approach that keeps the public policy rationale of whistleblower protection
at the forefront of the interpretation, while also relying on application of
the plain language, the history and purpose of the particular statute, and
any applicable precedent. When interpreting a statute, courts will first
look to the text of the statute itself and adopt the plain meaning of the
language if it unambiguously expresses the meaning Congress intended.154
However, if the language is ambiguous, courts are to consider the
“purpose, the subject matter and the condition of affairs which led to its
enactment.”155
There are many policy rationales for the protection of
whistleblowers. The first, which is fairly intuitive, is that whistleblower
protection “promotes legal compliance by employers.”156 In turn, when
employers are forced to comply with the laws to which they are subject,
the health, safety, and welfare of the public are enhanced.157
Whistleblowers also provide an essential public benefit because of their

152

See WILLBORN, supra note 59, at 166.
See id.; see Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Cal. 1994) (employee
of employer that was too small to be covered by state antidiscrimination statute cannot
use that statute as expression of public policy on which to base common law wrongful
discharge claim for age discrimination).
154
Haley v. Retsinas, 138 F.3d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998).
155
Id.
156
Peter D. Banick, Note, “Case Note: The “In-House” Whistleblower: Walking
the Line Between Good Cop and Bad Cop”, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1868, 1874
(2011).
157
Id.
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valued perspective – an inside look that “increases the likelihood of
discovery and the need to report wrongdoing.”158 Second, whistleblowers
facing significant career and financial risk would be far less likely to
unveil wrongful and unlawful activity by their employers without
protection.159 History indicates that a lack of protection breeds silence.
Third, protecting whistleblowers avoids less favorable alternatives, such
as greater government expenditures on watchdog and investigative
resources.160 Finally, there is an “inherent sense of unfairness and injustice
[that] would result in the absence of whistleblower protection.” 161 Society
should not punish individuals for reporting what they reasonably believe
to be unlawful or unethical behavior that also may be physically or
economically harmful to the general public.
As demonstrated by Scrivener and Haley, when the meaning of a
federal whistleblower statute is ambiguous, courts tend to, in consideration
of the purpose and condition of affairs that led to its enactment, construe
the statute broadly – in favor of protecting the whistleblower.162 The
statute at issue in Haley instructed that “no Federal banking agency may
discharge any employee…because the employee (or any person acting
pursuant to the request of the employee) provided information…regarding
any possible violation of any law or regulation . . . .” 163 The court had to
construe the ambiguous phrases within the statute to determine whether
Haley’s conduct constituted a “request” and whether the information
provided was “information regarding any possible violations of the
law.”164 Similarly, in Barcomb, the court was tasked with construing the
meaning of ambiguous language found in a federal whistleblower
protection statute.165 The Eighth Circuit interpreted both the meaning of
the word “defect” as well as the phrase “relating to” with a narrow
approach in favor of the employer rather than the whistleblower.166 The
court acknowledged the ambiguity of the phrase “relating to,” calling it a
“broad and indeterminate phrase,” but still proceeded to construe it
narrowly.167 In contrast, in Haley, once the court determined the phrase
158

Id. at 1875.
Id. at 1876.
160
Id. at 1875–76.
161
Id. at 1876.
162
Hill v. Mr. Money Fin. Co. & First Citizens Banc Corp., 309 Fed. Appx. 950,
961 (6th Cir. 2009).
163
Haley v. Retsinas, 138 F.3d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
164
Id. at 1248.
165
Barcomb v. Gen. Motors, LLC., 978 F.3d 545, 550 (8th Cir. 2020) (majority).
166
Id.
167
Id.
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“request” was ambiguous, it construed the statute broadly to protect the
whistleblower because that was the best way to “avoid a nonsensical result
and to effectuate the underlying purposes of the law.”168 Similarly, in
Bechtel and Scrivener, the respective courts found it appropriate to give a
broad construction to remedial statutes, such as whistleblower protection
laws, to “encourage safety concerns to be raised and resolved promptly”
as well as to effectuate the broad congressional purpose attached to the
respective statutes at issue in those cases.169
The court in Barcomb determined that the phrase “relating to,” which
the statute failed to define, was ambiguous, and the word “defect” was
“unfortunately circular” in its definition. 170 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit
should have adopted a broad construction to protect Barcomb.171 This
construction would have advanced the broad purpose of the statute in its
entirety – which was to “reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries
resulting from traffic accidents…by prescrib[ing] motor vehicle safety
standards… and carry[ing] out needed safety research and
development.”172 Barcomb’s tasks at the GM manufacturing plant
involved carrying out “needed safety development” by fulfilling crucial
quality assurance checks.173 His reports involved co-workers who were
actively falsifying reports of repairs in the final production stage for motor
vehicles.174 As Judge Melloy pointed out in his dissent, these vehicles
could very well have reached the end of the manufacturing process with
these defects going unnoticed.175 Thus, when applying the broadly
construed language of the statute to the facts of the case, Barcomb’s
reports of incomplete and false repairs should indeed be included as
protected reports of “information relating to motor vehicle defects.”176

VI. CONCLUSION
In Barcomb v. General Motors, the Eighth Circuit refused to broadly
interpret ambiguous language in the whistleblower protection provision of
MAP-21, even though established precedent instructs otherwise. As a
168

Haley, 138 F.3d at 1250.
Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 50 F.3d 926, 931 (11th Cir. 1995);
N.L.R.B. v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972).
170
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 548.
171
Id.
172
49 U.S.C. § 30101 (1994).
173
Barcomb, 978 F.3d at 547.
174
Id. at 548.
175
Id. at 553 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176
49 U.S.C. § 30171(a)(1) (2012).
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result, whistleblowers, who often may lack an adequate alternative
remedy, may think twice before raising safety concerns similar to those
raised by Barcomb. A statute that is broadly designed to encourage
employees to report any information relating to motor vehicle defects has
now been established as protecting only those who raise concerns about
post-manufacturing defects – leaving open to retaliation those employees
that witness and report information relating to defects along the production
line.
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